- 上一版默认 scope 名是猜的(account.read / email_routing.write),全部被拒。 正确词表是点号分隔的 <group>.<verb>,且: - 账号是 account-settings.read(选择器里叫 Account Settings Read),不是 account.read - Workers 脚本是 workers-scripts.write,不是 workers_scripts.write - Email Routing 在选择器里是四个独立权限,改 catch-all 对应 email-routing-rule.write - account:read 这种冒号写法是 wrangler 的第一方简写,第三方 client 一律被拒 - client 注册的 scope 是上限不是默认:没勾的权限即使账号有也不生效 - preflight 扩展 scope 探测:授权端点在同意页之前就校验并点名拒绝的 scope, 逐轮「请求剩余候选 -> 剔除被点名项」即可收敛出 App 已授权集合(未认证请求, 不登录/不产生授权),结果按 allowed/denied 返回并在设置页用绿/橙标签展示 - 缺少账号级读权限时不再失败:discover() 先试 /accounts,403 则改为列 token 可见的 /zones, 用 zone 自带的 account_id 反推账户(展示名用第一个域名) - 默认 scope 收敛为接入必需的三项(zone.read / workers-scripts.write / email-routing-rule.write),account-settings.read 改为可选:勾了才显示真实账号名 - 实测:线上 preflight 已 ok=true(Cloudflare 跳登录页),无需再改 App 即可「添加账号」
528 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript
528 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Cloudflare API 客户端:真实调用 api.cloudflare.com / dash.cloudflare.com。
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*
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* OAuth access token 来自 Cloudflare OAuth 授权(docs/02),Console 用它完成
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* 账号/域名发现、Email Worker 部署与 Email Routing 配置。
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*
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* OAuth 客户端凭据(client id / secret)有两个来源,settings 表优先、env 兜底:
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* 1. settings 表 —— 在「设置 → Cloudflare 接入」里填写;secret 用 AES-GCM 加密存储
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* (cf_oauth_client_secret_enc),只回 last4。保存后立即生效,无需重新部署。
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* 2. env 变量 CF_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID / CF_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET —— 部署时注入的兜底。
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* 两者都没有时不提供任何降级通道,接入接口直接返回 503,避免出现"看似接入成功"的假数据。
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*/
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import { renderEmailWorkerScript } from "../../../shared/src/index.ts";
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import type { Env } from "../env.ts";
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import { decryptSecret, encryptSecret, getSetting, setSetting } from "../db.ts";
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/** # 成员变量: OAuth 授权端点 **/
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export const CF_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL = "https://dash.cloudflare.com/oauth2/auth";
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/** # 成员变量: OAuth token 端点 **/
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export const CF_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL = "https://dash.cloudflare.com/oauth2/token";
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/** # 成员变量: Cloudflare API 基址 **/
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export const CF_API_BASE = "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4";
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/** # 成员变量: 授权回调路径 **/
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export const CF_OAUTH_CALLBACK_PATH = "/api/oauth/cloudflare/callback";
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/** # 成员变量: 本应用实际需要的 scope(点号分隔;与 Cloudflare OAuth App 里勾选的权限对应)
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*
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* 重要背景(实测结论):
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* - Cloudflare 第三方 OAuth 客户端的 scope 是 **点号分隔** 的 `<group>.<verb>`;
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* `account:read` 这种冒号写法是 **wrangler 的第一方简写**,第三方客户端请求会被直接拒。
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* - 「账号」不是 `account.read` 而是 `account-settings.read`(选择器里叫 Account Settings Read);
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它只用来取账号名,**默认不请求** —— 缺它时 discover() 会从 zone 的 account_id 反推账户。
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* - Email Routing 在选择器里是 **四个独立权限**,其中改 catch-all 规则对应
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* `email-routing-rule.write`(选择器里叫 Email Routing Rules Edit)。
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* - 客户端注册的 scope 是「上限」而不是「默认值」:请求里没写的 scope 不会自动生效。
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* 以上名称可用 /cloudflare/preflight 的 scope 探测功能现场核对(见 discoverAllowedScopes)。
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**/
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export const CF_OAUTH_SCOPES_DEFAULT = [
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"zone.read",
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"workers-scripts.write",
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"email-routing-rule.write",
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].join(" ");
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/** # 成员变量: scope 探测候选集(本应用所需 + 常见备选)
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* 探测时逐个试:被 Cloudflare 点名拒绝的剔除,剩下的即为 App 已授权的集合。 **/
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export const CF_OAUTH_SCOPE_CANDIDATES = [
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"account-settings.read",
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"zone.read",
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"workers-scripts.write",
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"email-routing-rule.write",
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"email-routing-account-rule.read",
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"email-routing-address.write",
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"email-routing-suppression.write",
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"zone-settings.read",
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];
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/** # 成员变量: settings 表中保存 OAuth 客户端凭据的 key **/
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export const CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS = {
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clientId: "cf_oauth_client_id",
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secretEnc: "cf_oauth_client_secret_enc",
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secretLast4: "cf_oauth_client_secret_last4",
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scopes: "cf_oauth_scopes",
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} as const;
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/** # 成员变量: 已解析的 Cloudflare OAuth 客户端凭据 **/
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export interface CFOAuthClient {
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clientId: string;
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clientSecret: string;
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/** 凭据来源:settings(后台设置)优先,env(部署变量)兜底 */
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source: "settings" | "env";
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 解析当前生效的 Cloudflare OAuth 客户端凭据(settings 优先,env 兜底)
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* 返回值: 未配置时 null
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*/
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export async function getOAuthClient(env: Env): Promise<CFOAuthClient | null> {
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const [clientId, secretEnc] = await Promise.all([
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getSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.clientId),
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getSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.secretEnc),
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]);
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if (clientId && secretEnc) {
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try {
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const secret = await decryptSecret(env, secretEnc);
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if (secret) return { clientId, clientSecret: secret, source: "settings" };
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} catch {
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// 密文损坏(主密钥变更等)时继续尝试 env 兜底
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}
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}
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if (env.CF_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID && env.CF_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET) {
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return { clientId: env.CF_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, clientSecret: env.CF_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, source: "env" };
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}
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return null;
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}
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/** # 函数
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* Cloudflare OAuth 是否已配置(settings 或 env 任一来源可用)
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*/
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export async function isOAuthConfigured(env: Env): Promise<boolean> {
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return (await getOAuthClient(env)) !== null;
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}
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/** # 函数
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* OAuth 客户端凭据的展示用元信息(不含明文 secret)
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*/
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export async function oauthClientMeta(
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env: Env,
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): Promise<{ client_id: string; has_secret: boolean; secret_last4: string; source: "settings" | "env" | "none" }> {
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const client = await getOAuthClient(env);
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if (!client) return { client_id: "", has_secret: false, secret_last4: "", source: "none" };
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const last4 = await getSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.secretLast4);
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return {
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client_id: client.clientId,
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has_secret: true,
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secret_last4: client.source === "settings" ? (last4 ?? "") : client.clientSecret.slice(-4),
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source: client.source,
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};
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 保存 OAuth 客户端凭据到 settings(secret 加密存储,只留 last4 供展示)
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*/
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export async function saveOAuthClient(env: Env, clientId: string, secret: string): Promise<void> {
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await setSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.clientId, clientId);
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await setSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.secretEnc, await encryptSecret(env, secret));
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await setSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.secretLast4, secret.slice(-4));
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 清除 settings 中的 OAuth 客户端凭据(env 兜底不受影响)
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*/
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export async function clearOAuthClient(env: Env): Promise<void> {
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for (const key of Object.values(CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS)) {
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await env.DB.prepare("DELETE FROM settings WHERE key = ?").bind(key).run();
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}
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 解析实际请求的 scope 列表(settings 覆盖默认值;空白回退默认)
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*/
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export async function getOAuthScopes(env: Env): Promise<string> {
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const custom = (await getSetting(env, CF_OAUTH_SETTING_KEYS.scopes))?.trim();
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return custom || CF_OAUTH_SCOPES_DEFAULT;
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 拼出 Cloudflare 授权页 URL
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*/
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export function buildAuthorizeUrl(opts: { clientId: string; redirectUri: string; scopes: string; state: string }): string {
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return (
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`${CF_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?response_type=code` +
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`&client_id=${encodeURIComponent(opts.clientId)}` +
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`&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(opts.redirectUri)}` +
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`&scope=${encodeURIComponent(opts.scopes)}` +
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`&state=${encodeURIComponent(opts.state)}`
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);
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}
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/** # 成员变量: 授权配置自检结果 **/
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export interface OAuthPreflight {
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/** 授权端点是否接受当前 client_id / redirect_uri / scope 组合 */
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ok: boolean;
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/** Cloudflare 返回的 Location 指向(登录同意页 = 配置正确) */
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location: string;
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/** 错误码(invalid_scope / invalid_request / access_denied ...) */
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error: string | null;
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/** 错误描述原文 */
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description: string | null;
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/** 给用户的处置建议 */
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hint: string | null;
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/** 本次自检使用的参数 */
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used: { client_id: string; redirect_uri: string; scope: string };
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/** scope 探测结果:App 已授权 / 尚未授权 */
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scopes: { allowed: string[]; denied: string[]; probed: boolean; note: string | null };
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 授权配置自检:用当前配置请求 Cloudflare 授权端点但**不跟随跳转**,
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* 据跳转目标判断 OAuth App 是否配置正确(纯只读探测,不会产生授权)。
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* 这样不用开浏览器就能验证 Client URI 校验、是否已 promote to public、scope 是否已授权。
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*/
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export async function preflightOAuth(env: Env, requestOrigin: string): Promise<OAuthPreflight> {
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const client = await getOAuthClient(env);
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const redirectUri = oauthRedirectUri(env, requestOrigin);
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const scope = await getOAuthScopes(env);
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const used = { client_id: client?.clientId ?? "", redirect_uri: redirectUri, scope };
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const noScopes = { allowed: [], denied: [], probed: false, note: null };
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if (!client) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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location: "",
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error: "not_configured",
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description: "尚未配置 Cloudflare OAuth 客户端",
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hint: "先在下方填入 Client ID 与 Client Secret 并保存",
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used,
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scopes: noScopes,
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};
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}
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let resp: Response;
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try {
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resp = await fetch(
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buildAuthorizeUrl({ clientId: client.clientId, redirectUri, scopes: scope, state: "wmh_preflight" }),
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{ redirect: "manual" },
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);
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} catch (err) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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location: "",
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error: "network",
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description: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
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hint: "Console 无法访问 dash.cloudflare.com,请检查出网",
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used,
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scopes: noScopes,
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};
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}
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const location = resp.headers.get("location") ?? "";
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if (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400 && location) {
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const target = new URL(location, redirectUri);
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const callbackBase = redirectUri.split("?")[0];
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// Cloudflare 拒绝授权时有两种落点:弹回我们登记的回调地址,或跳它自己的 /oauth/error 页
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const isCallbackBounce = location.startsWith(callbackBase);
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const isCfErrorPage = target.origin === "https://dash.cloudflare.com" && target.pathname.startsWith("/oauth/");
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if (isCallbackBounce || isCfErrorPage) {
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const error = target.searchParams.get("error");
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const description = target.searchParams.get("error_description");
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// 被拒的是 scope 时顺便探测出「已授权 / 待勾选」,省得用户猜选择器里该勾哪几项
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const scopes =
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error === "invalid_scope"
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? await discoverAllowedScopes(client.clientId, redirectUri)
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: { allowed: [], denied: [], probed: false, note: null };
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return { ok: false, location, error, description, hint: hintForOAuthError(error), used, scopes };
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}
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// 跳到登录/同意页 = client_id、redirect_uri、scope 全部被接受
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return { ok: true, location, error: null, description: null, hint: null, used, scopes: noScopes };
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}
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return {
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ok: false,
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location,
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error: `http_${resp.status}`,
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description: `授权端点返回 HTTP ${resp.status}`,
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hint: "检查 Client ID 是否正确",
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used,
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scopes: noScopes,
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};
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}
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/** # 函数
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* scope 探测:授权端点在**显示同意页之前**就会校验 scope,被拒时通过 error_description 点名是哪一个。
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* 于是可以逐轮「请求剩余候选 → 剔除被点名的那个」,收敛出该 App 实际已授权的集合。
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* 全程无需登录/同意,不产生任何授权;每轮一个未认证请求。
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* 返回值: allowed=已授权、denied=尚未授权(需在选择器里补勾)
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*/
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async function probeScopes(
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clientId: string,
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redirectUri: string,
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): Promise<{ allowed: string[]; denied: string[]; error: string | null }> {
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const remaining = [...CF_OAUTH_SCOPE_CANDIDATES];
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const denied: string[] = [];
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for (let i = 0; i < CF_OAUTH_SCOPE_CANDIDATES.length + 1; i++) {
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if (remaining.length === 0) return { allowed: [], denied, error: null };
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let location = "";
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try {
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const resp = await fetch(
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buildAuthorizeUrl({ clientId, redirectUri, scopes: remaining.join(" "), state: "wmh_preflight" }),
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{ redirect: "manual" },
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);
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location = resp.headers.get("location") ?? "";
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} catch {
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return { allowed: remaining, denied, error: "network" };
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}
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if (!location) return { allowed: remaining, denied, error: "no_redirect" };
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const target = new URL(location, redirectUri);
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const error = target.searchParams.get("error");
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if (error !== "invalid_scope") {
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// 其它错误(回调地址不匹配等)与 scope 无关,停止并把剩余当作"未知"
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return { allowed: remaining, denied, error };
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}
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const named = /scope '([^']+)'/.exec(target.searchParams.get("error_description") ?? "")?.[1];
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const rejected = named && remaining.includes(named) ? named : remaining[0];
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denied.push(rejected);
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remaining.splice(remaining.indexOf(rejected), 1);
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}
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return { allowed: remaining, denied, error: null };
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 对外包装的 scope 探测:返回可直接展示给用户的结果
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*/
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export async function discoverAllowedScopes(
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clientId: string,
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redirectUri: string,
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): Promise<OAuthPreflight["scopes"]> {
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const res = await probeScopes(clientId, redirectUri);
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if (res.error) {
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return {
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allowed: res.allowed,
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denied: res.denied,
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probed: false,
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note: `scope 探测中断(${res.error});请在 Cloudflare App 里逐项核对权限`,
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};
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}
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return { allowed: res.allowed, denied: res.denied, probed: true, note: null };
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 把 Cloudflare 授权错误翻译成可执行的处置建议
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*/
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function hintForOAuthError(error: string | null): string | null {
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if (error === "invalid_scope") {
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return (
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"OAuth App 不允许请求本应用需要的某些 scope。到 Cloudflare Dashboard → My Profile → OAuth Applications " +
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"编辑该应用:Client URI 填 Console 域名(如 https://wmailhub.adx9.com)、按提示加 TXT 记录完成域名校验、" +
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"Promote to public,并在选择器里勾选下方「待勾选」列出的权限。客户端注册的 scope 是上限而非默认," +
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"没勾的权限即使账号有也不会生效。"
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);
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}
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if (error === "invalid_request") {
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return (
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"请求被拒:最常见是回调地址(Redirect URL)与应用里登记的不一致——请把本页显示的回调地址原样填进 " +
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"Cloudflare OAuth App 的 Redirect URL(本应用不会用其它地址回调)。"
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);
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}
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if (error === "access_denied") {
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return "授权被拒绝:请在 Cloudflare 页面确认同意授权。";
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}
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return null;
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 计算 OAuth 授权回调地址(优先 CF_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI,其次 PUBLIC_BASE_URL,最后请求 origin)
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*/
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export function oauthRedirectUri(env: Env, requestOrigin: string): string {
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const base = env.CF_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI ?? env.PUBLIC_BASE_URL ?? requestOrigin;
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return base.endsWith(CF_OAUTH_CALLBACK_PATH)
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? base
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: `${base.replace(/\/$/, "")}${CF_OAUTH_CALLBACK_PATH}`;
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}
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/** # 成员变量: 邮件发现的 Cloudflare 资源描述 **/
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export interface CFAccount {
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id: string;
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name: string;
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}
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export interface CFZone {
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id: string;
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name: string;
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account_id: string;
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status: string;
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}
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/** # 成员变量: 账号/域名发现结果 **/
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export interface CFDiscovery {
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/** 目标 Cloudflare 账户(id + 展示名) */
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account: CFAccount;
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/** 该账户(或 token 可见)下的域名 Zone */
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zones: CFZone[];
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/** 账号来源:accounts 接口,或因缺少账号级读权限而从 zone 的 account_id 反推 */
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accountSource: "accounts" | "zones";
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}
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/** # 成员变量: Cloudflare API 客户端接口(自动安装所需操作) **/
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export interface CFApi {
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/** 用 code 换 access token */
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exchangeToken(code: string, redirectUri: string): Promise<{ accessToken: string; expiresIn: number }>;
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/** 发现 token 可访问的账户 + 其下域名 */
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discover(accessToken: string): Promise<CFDiscovery>;
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/** 创建或更新账号级 Email Worker(幂等) */
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putEmailWorker(opts: {
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accessToken: string;
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accountId: string;
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scriptName: string;
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/** Console 对外地址(Worker -> Console) **/
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consoleUrl: string;
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/** Worker 身份(与 WorkerCredential.worker_id 一致) **/
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workerId: string;
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/** Worker credential secret(HMAC 签名密钥) **/
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workerSecret: string;
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}): Promise<{ id: string }>;
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/** 开启 Zone 的 Email Routing(幂等) */
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enableEmailRouting(opts: { accessToken: string; zoneId: string }): Promise<{ enabled: boolean }>;
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/** 配置 Zone catch-all 规则指向 Email Worker(幂等) */
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setCatchAllRule(opts: {
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accessToken: string;
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zoneId: string;
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workerName: string;
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}): Promise<{ ok: boolean }>;
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}
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/** # 函数
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* 构造 Cloudflare API 客户端(内部使用已解析的 OAuth 客户端凭据)
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* 返回值: 未配置 OAuth 客户端时抛错(调用方应先判断 isOAuthConfigured)
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*/
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export async function getCFApi(env: Env): Promise<CFApi> {
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const client = await getOAuthClient(env);
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if (!client) throw new Error("cloudflare oauth not configured");
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return new RealCFApi(client);
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}
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/** # 成员变量: Cloudflare API 实现 **/
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export class RealCFApi implements CFApi {
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/** # 成员变量: OAuth 客户端凭据(settings 或 env) **/
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constructor(private client: CFOAuthClient) {}
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async exchangeToken(code: string, redirectUri: string) {
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const resp = await fetch(CF_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
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body: new URLSearchParams({
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grant_type: "authorization_code",
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code,
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client_id: this.client.clientId,
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client_secret: this.client.clientSecret,
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redirect_uri: redirectUri,
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}),
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});
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if (!resp.ok) throw new Error(`cloudflare token exchange failed: ${resp.status}`);
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const data = (await resp.json()) as { access_token: string; expires_in?: number };
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return { accessToken: data.access_token, expiresIn: data.expires_in ?? 3600 };
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}
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private async api<T>(token: string, path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
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const resp = await fetch(`${CF_API_BASE}${path}`, {
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...init,
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headers: {
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Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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...(init?.headers ?? {}),
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},
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});
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const data = (await resp.json()) as { success: boolean; errors?: { message: string }[]; result: T };
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if (!data.success) throw new Error(`cloudflare api ${path}: ${data.errors?.[0]?.message ?? resp.status}`);
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return data.result;
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}
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listAccounts(token: string) {
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return this.api<CFAccount[]>(token, "/accounts");
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}
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async listZones(token: string, accountId?: string) {
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// 分页拉全 Zone(每页 50,最多 20 页);不给 accountId 时返回 token 可见的全部 Zone
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const out: CFZone[] = [];
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for (let page = 1; page <= 20; page++) {
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const query = new URLSearchParams({ per_page: "50", page: String(page) });
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if (accountId) query.set("account.id", accountId);
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const rows = await this.api<CFZone[]>(token, `/zones?${query.toString()}`);
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out.push(...rows);
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if (rows.length < 50) break;
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}
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return out;
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}
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/** 账号 + 域名发现。
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* 优先用 /accounts 拿账户名(需要账号级读权限);
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* 没有该权限时退而求其次:直接列 token 可见的 Zone,用 zone 自带的 account_id 反推账户,
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* 展示名用第一个域名代替 —— 这样只要授权了 zone.read 就能完成接入。 */
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async discover(token: string): Promise<CFDiscovery> {
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try {
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const accounts = await this.listAccounts(token);
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if (accounts.length > 0) {
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const account = accounts[0];
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return { account, zones: await this.listZones(token, account.id), accountSource: "accounts" };
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}
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} catch {
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// 缺少账号级读权限,走下面的反推路径
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}
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const zones = await this.listZones(token);
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if (zones.length === 0) throw new Error("no cloudflare zone accessible with this token");
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const accountId = zones[0].account_id;
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const more = zones.length > 1 ? ` 等 ${zones.length} 个域名` : "";
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return { account: { id: accountId, name: `${zones[0].name}${more}` }, zones, accountSource: "zones" };
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}
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async putEmailWorker(opts: {
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accessToken: string;
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accountId: string;
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scriptName: string;
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consoleUrl: string;
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workerId: string;
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workerSecret: string;
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}) {
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// Email Worker 即带 email handler 的 Worker 脚本;Console 地址与 Worker 凭据以明文常量打进脚本,
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// 避免给 Worker 配置额外的 secrets 绑定(docs/11 §8:凭据本身经 HMAC 保护 Console API)。
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const script = renderEmailWorkerScript(opts.consoleUrl, opts.workerId, opts.workerSecret);
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const form = new FormData();
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form.append(
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"metadata",
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new Blob([JSON.stringify({ main_module: "worker.js", bindings: [] })], { type: "application/json" }),
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);
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form.append("worker.js", new Blob([script], { type: "application/javascript+module" }));
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const resp = await fetch(
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`${CF_API_BASE}/accounts/${opts.accountId}/workers/scripts/${opts.scriptName}`,
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{
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method: "PUT",
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headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${opts.accessToken}` },
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body: form,
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},
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);
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if (!resp.ok) throw new Error(`upload email worker failed: ${resp.status}`);
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return { id: opts.scriptName };
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}
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async enableEmailRouting(opts: { accessToken: string; zoneId: string }) {
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await this.api(opts.accessToken, `/zones/${opts.zoneId}/email/routing`, {
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method: "POST",
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body: JSON.stringify({ enabled: true, skip_wizard: true }),
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});
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return { enabled: true };
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}
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async setCatchAllRule(opts: { accessToken: string; zoneId: string; workerName: string }) {
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await this.api(opts.accessToken, `/zones/${opts.zoneId}/email/routing/rules/catch_all`, {
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method: "PUT",
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body: JSON.stringify({
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matchers: [{ type: "all" }],
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actions: [{ type: "worker", value: [opts.workerName] }],
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enabled: true,
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name: "wmailhub catch-all",
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}),
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});
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return { ok: true };
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}
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}
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