- Monorepo: NestJS API (Fastify) + React web (antd/ProComponents) + shared packages - PostgreSQL/Prisma (unified resources, relations graph, audit, events, jobs) - Auth/RBAC/workspace isolation, credential vault (AES-256-GCM) - Servers/SSH, Docker discovery & lifecycle, Job Center - Websites & deployments (git provider credential clone, env, health verification) - Domains/DNS (Cloudflare adapter), certificates (TLS probe), monitoring - Automation (cron/event/webhook HMAC + notifications), AI Gateway, MCP (29 tools) - AI chat window (LLM function-calling + rules fallback, SSE streaming, approvals) - Notes: Vditor WYSIWYG markdown editor, non-blocking autosave - Tests: 35 unit/security tests; UI audit clean (desktop+mobile, deep links)
36 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
36 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
# 08 — Security Hardening
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这是继续开发前的 P0 gate。
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## 立即处理
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1. 修改/禁用 README 中暴露的默认管理员账号密码。
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2. 轮换 APP_SECRET。
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3. 轮换 ENCRYPTION_KEY 前先设计 credential migration/clear strategy;不要盲目轮换导致现有凭据全部不可解密。
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4. 检查公网注册策略;生产模式默认关闭公开注册,或增加 invite-only。
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5. 检查 `/root/.ldns/config.toml`,确认 token 不进入项目、日志、git、API 响应。
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6. 删除冒烟测试 credential/test-token。
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## Auth
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增加:
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- password change
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- session invalidation strategy(即使 V1 暂不实现完整 revoke list,也必须保留扩展点)
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- login rate limit
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- register rate limit
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- optional invite-only mode
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## Credentials
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- AES-256-GCM 保留
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- key 不存数据库
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- secret access audit
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- API never returns plaintext
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- logs redact tokens/passwords/keys
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- export disabled by default
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## Command security
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危险命令检测只是最后一道防线,不是授权机制。
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真正权限模型必须先于 command execution。
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## Production config
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生产启动时必须拒绝明显开发默认 secret。
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`.env.example` 可以有 placeholder,但 runtime 必须校验。
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